Practice of Expired Patents by Limbach, Karl A.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 8 | Issue 2
1957
Practice of Expired Patents
Karl A. Limbach
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Karl A. Limbach, Practice of Expired Patents, 8 W. Res. L. Rev. 183 (1957)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol8/iss2/7
NOTES
Practice of Expired Patents
INTRODUCTION
The justification for the government's grant of patent monopolies
is found in the Constitution of -the United States, which gives to Con-
gress the power "to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective wLtitmgs and discoveries."' (Emphasis added). From
ths justification emanates the basic principle of patent law that every
patent must expire, and that the public has an interest in the subject
matter of expired patents. This principle has two major aspects: first,
that any member of the public may practice the specific subject matter
of an expired patent;2 second, that the public as a whole has an interest m
free, unhindered competition in the manufacture, use and sale of the
subjects which were at one time protected by patent monopolies.a
During the life of a patent every member of the public has been
restrained from competing with the owner of the patent and hence has
suffered a detriment by being precluded from making some article which,
theoretically, he knew about and wanted to sell. Presumably, people
wanted to buy the article and the potential manufacturer could make a
profit selling it because it was not being manufactured and sold in an
open market. Because this potential competitor has suffered such a detri-
ment while the patent owner reaped the proceeds of an exclusive market,
the competitor has a right to practice the imvention of the patent when
the patent monopoly expires.4
The public as a whole is interested n preventing unreasonable re-
straints on competition in all markets. It as interested to an even greater
extent in preventing restraints on competition in goods of expired patents,
because it has permitted monopoly in the exploitation of the patented
commodity during the life of the patent. 5
Furthermore, while the patent owner has enjoyed the benefits of his
patent, the public as a whole has paid the price of a restricted market.
IU. S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8.
'Throughout this article the phrase "practice the subject matter of an expired patent"
and its equivalents are used for convenience as generic phrases which include "mak-
ing, using, or selling the device shown in the patent" and "using the method de-
scribed in the patent."
'Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945); Singer Mfg. Co. v.
June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
'Singer Mfg. Co. v. June fg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896); West Point Mfg. Co. v.
Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 840
(1956).
'Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945).
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The patent owner has been free to charge the public the price he wants
for his goods, without losing his business to competitors who are either
more economical manufacturers or willing to sell their goods at a smaller
profit. Because of this detniment the public is rewarded with a free
competitive market in the commodity of the patent owner as soon as -the
patent expires.
One of the basic principles of patent law might therefore be stated
as follows: the subject matter of expired patents -is the property of the
public, and any person is free to make, use or sell the devices and
methods covered by these expired patents.
It is understood, of course, that this principle applies only -to the
specific disclosure of the expired patent and that even though some
device may have been covered by the claims of a broad basic expired
patent, it may still :be the subject matter of a subsequent narrower patent
This is illustrated by the situation in which a patent was granted cover-
ing a sponge made out of substance X, which 'had unique cleaning charac-
teristics, and a subsequent patent was granted covering the sponge im-
pregnated with soap. When the first patent expired, everyone would be
free to make the sponge provided they did not impregnate it with soap.
The claims of the first patent covered all sponges made of substance X,
whether impregnated with soap or not, but the sponge impregnated with
soap was not part of the disclosure of the first patent.
The purpose of this article is .to analyze the extent to which this prin-
ciple of public property in expired patents is followed, and the extent
to which it is modified where it conflicts with various other principles.
CONTRACTS IN GENERAL
One of the fundamental concepts on which our free society is founded
is the principle that parties are free to contract as they wish. However,
in many situations, outside the scope of this article, this principle is
limited where the parties wish to form an agreement in which some ele-
ment is illegal or violates some strong public policy.
Relying on 'this principle of freedom of contract, patent owners have
attempted to extend the terms of patents beyond their normal expira-
tions, and have found that the concept of public property in expired
patents restricts freedom of contract. No case has 'been found where
the parties -to a contract have specifically agreed, that, as between them,
a patent will not expire until after its normal expiration date, and that
one of the parties could be sued for infringement of the patent after it
had expired. Such a contract would be so -blatant an attack upon the
principle of public property of expired patents that none would expect
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its validity to be sustained. However, many contractual devices have
been conceived to achieve the result by indirect means.
The owner of a patent on a machine contracts to sell the machine
and the right to use it to a purchaser, who in return promises to buy
from the owner all of the unpatented supplies needed for the operation
of the machine. Whether the unpatented supplies are the subject of an
expired patent6 or were never patented at all,' the promise of the pur-
chaser is unenforceable because it substantially lessens competition be-
tween the patent owner and other manufacturers of the unpatented sup-
plies in violation of section three of the Clayton Act.8  Here the anti-
trust laws cooperate with the principle of public property in expired
patents to prevent the extension of the monopoly of an expired patent by
tying the unpatented goods to other patented goods
This protection of -the public's -interest in unpatented articles from
contracts tying unpatented goods to patented goods is further extended
-by prohibiting the owner of a patented combination of unpatented com-
ponent parts from licensing a customer to use the combination, on the
condition that he purchase all or any of the component parts from the
patent owner.10
In one case, the prohibition against tying unpatented goods to pat-
ented ones was overlooked where the sale of automobiles to franchised
dealers was accompamed by a covenant by the dealer to buy all of his re-
placement parts from the manufacturer.'" The covenant was sustained
on the ground that the manufacturer who guaranteed the cars for a short
period, and whose name and future sales would be injured by defects in
the car, had a right to control the quality of the car in the hands of the
ultimate consumer. The court stressed the fact that such quality would
remain associated with the manufacturer, because the servicing of the
'Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917)
"I. B. M. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); Carbice Corp. v. American Patents
Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
a38 STAT. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1914); which provides, "It shall be unlawful for
any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to lease or make
a sale or contract for sale of goods, warts, merchandise, machinery, supplies or
other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption or resale
within the United States on the condition, agreement or understanding that the
lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods of a competitor or
competitors of the lessor or sellor, where the effect of such lease, sale or contract for
sale or such condition, agreement or understanding may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."
"I. B. M. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
'R. C. A. v. Lord, 28 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1928), cert. dented, 278 U.S. 648 (1928).
UPick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors, 80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935), aff'd mem., 299
U.S. 3 (1936).
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car was always done at one of the manufacturer's franchised dealers.
However, this holding is strictly limited to its facts and from its very
nature is applicable to only a few cases. Furthermore, considering the
Supreme Court's present strict attitude toward monopolies, ,it is doubtful
that the Court would follow it in any case today.12
LIC NSES
Between a patent owner and his licensees, the patent monopoly ter-
minates when the obligation of the licensee to pay royalties terminates,
since one of the basic elements of the relationship betwen licensee and
patent owner is the duty of the former to pay. Because of the principle
that the patent monopoly ceases to exist and the invention becomes
public property when the patent expires, a patent license is presumed
to terminate upon the expiration of the patent.'3
However, a debtor can agree to pay his debt on any installment plan
or deferred payment plan which he can persuade his creditor to accept,
and there seems to be no reason why this piinciple would not apply to
patent royalties as readily as it does to the purchase price of a household
appliance. The parties to a license agreement, therefore, may contract
for the payment of royalties after the patent expires.14
While the courts indicate that the parties may contract for the pay-
ment of royalties after the patent expires, they are reluctant to hold that
the particular license in question was intended to continue beyond the
expiration of the patent.15  In the case of Sprouil v. Pratt & Whtaey
Co.'6 a federal court of appeals considered a group of licenses for three
similar articles and a machine for making one of them. The court held
that while some licenses could be construed as a unit so as to expire when
'Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
"Eskno Pie Corp. v. National Ice Cream Co., 20 F.2d 1003 (W.D. Ky. 1927),
aff'd, 26 F.2d 901 (6th Cir. 1928); Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pacific Ry. Co.,
270 Fed. 518 (2d Cir. 1920); Sproull v. Pratt & Whitney Co., 108 Fed. 963 (2d
Cir. 1901); cf. Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544 (1872)
"Squibb & Sons Co. v. Chemical Foundation, 93 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1937); Pressed
Steel Car Co. v. Union Pacific Ry. Co.,,270 Fed. 518 (2d Cir. 1920); H-P-M
Development Co. v. Watson-Stillman Co., 71 F. Supp. 906 (D.C.N.J. 1947). In
Six Star Lubricants Co. v. Morehouse, 101 Colo. 491, 497, 74 P.2d 1239, 1242
(1938), the court stated: 'There is no legal inhibition against a party contracting
to pay royalty on a patented article or formula for a period beyond the date of ex-
piration of the patents."
""Although the general rule is that liability to pay royalties terminates upon the
expiration of the patent, the parties may contract to the contrary. We discover
nothing in the contract to the contrary." Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pacific Ry.
Co., 270 Fed. 518, 524 (2d Cir. 1920).
'a 108 Fed. 963 (2d Cir. 1901).
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the last patent expired, the language of these particular licenses was not
sufficiently dear to overcome the presumption that each license expired
with its own patent. In Squibb & Sons v. Chemiwal Foundatzn,17 the
same circuit court, considering five licenses for five patents covering a
product, its ingredients and means for administering it, held that if the
parties wish to make royalties payable after expiration of the patent,
they must state so expressly.
Though no cases have been decided on the point, it -is quite apparent
from the courts' attitude in these cases that the power to contract for
payment of royalties after the expiration of a patent is allowed under
the principle of freedom of contract, but will not be extended in any
way so as to modify the principle of public property in expired patents.
If the period of royalty payment after the patent expired were exces-
sively long, the courts would probably hold that the royalty provision of
the license was invalid, on the ground that its intent was to extend the
patent monopoly rather than to provide an agreeable payment plan. Cer-
tainly a license for the payment of royalties indefinitely would be in-
valid as an attempt to extend the monopoly. Similarly, a license for a
million years, though for a fimte period, would be the equivalent of a
license for an indefinite period. In determining what would be a valid
period of royalty payment after the patent expires, the test of "a fimte
period" is not acceptable. Rather, the yardstick of a "reasonable period"
should be applied.
CONTRACTS NOT TO CoMnPET
The patent owner may attempt to extend the term of his patent
monopoly by obtaining from his most important competitor a contractual
promise not to compete. This attempt may be effective on a limited
scale, but no such restraint is permitted where the effect thereof would
be to continue the patent owner's monopoly for any substantial time or
in any substantial market.
Certainly, where the patent owner's most important potential com-
petitor is one of his employees, a contract not to compete may be sus-
tained 8 However, such contracts between employer and employee are
sustained only where the restrictions on the employee are for a reasonable
time and geographic area.19
While contracts not to compete have been sustained on a limited scale,
-93 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1937).
"Broxham v. Borden's Farm Products, 53 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1931); Wark v. Ervin
Press, 48 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1931).
'Oregon Stream Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64 (1873).
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no case has been found where one of the parties expressly contracted not
to practice an expired patent. It seems dear, 'however, that such a con-
tract would not be enforced. In addition, it may be that in construing
the reasonableness of the future restrictions of an employment contract,
the court would consider the fact that competition between employer and
employee is in the field of goods which were covered by an expired
patent ° If the goods were covered 'by an expired patent, the court would
probably view -the employment contract with a more jaundiced eye.
ESTOPPIEL
A person who contracts with the patent owner to pay the latter a
royalty in return for the privilege of practicing the invention of the
patent, that is a licensee, is accepting the benefits of the patent. Because
the licensee accepts the benefits of the patent, he -is -held to have admitted
the patent's validity.21 Therefore, if the patent owner sues hun for
royalties due under the license, the licensee is estopped from claiming
that the patent is invalid and hence that his promise to pay royalties is not
supported by consideration.22
Invalidity of a patent can be based on several grounds, one of which
is that the invention was patented in this country before the patentee con-
ceived the invention.23 Therefore, in an infringement suit, the defendant
may introduce in evidence prior patents which 'he contends disclosed the
invention before the patent owner or his assignor conceived at, or which
he contends disclosed the invention more than a year prior to the time
when the plaintiff's patent was applied for.24 These prior patents which
' "The trend of modern authorities is that such covenants, when reasonably limited
as to time and place, and when reasonably calculated to protect the lawful business
of the employer, will be enforced." Wark v. Ervin Press, 48 F.2d 152, 155 (7th
Cir. 1931). If the effect of the contract were to extend the patent monopoly of
the employer, would not a court refuse to enforce the covenant on the ground that
it was not designed to protect the lawful business of the employer?
'E-I-M Co. v. Philadelphia Gear Works, 223 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1955), cert.
dented, 350 U.S. 933 (1956); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Skinner, 166 F.2d 66 (6th
Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 858 (1948); cf. Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus
Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945).
'Reynolds Metals Co. v. Skinner, 166 F.2d 66 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334
U.S. 858 (1948)
266 STAT. 797, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1952) The section provides a number of other
grounds on which a patent may be held invalid, among which is the fact that the in-
vention was "patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign
country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the
date of the application for patent in the United States." The section, therefore, pre-
scribes several other grounds of invalidity which will be considered subsequently,
viz: (a) publication a year prior to application, (b) patenting a year prior to ap-
plication, and (c) public use and sale a year prior to application.
24Id. at (b).
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invalidate a patent on either of these grounds are said to "anticipate ' the
patent owner's invention.
In a suit between the patent owner and a licensee in which the latter
defends solely on the ground that certain prior patents anticipate the
owner's patent, the patent owner will generally prevail on the ground that
the licensee is estopped from contesting the validity of the patent under
which he is licensed.25
This doctrine of estoppel of the licensee is substantially limited,
however, by the principle that the licensee may rely on prior patents to
limit the scope of the patent under which he is licensed,26 even if such
limitation results in so narrow a scope that, in effect, the patent is in-
valid2 7  This principle is based on practical considerations in that the
owner of a patent cannot make his licensees pay royalties on every article
they produce, regardless of whether the article is within the scope of the
patent. In an extreme hypothetical case, a patent owner who licensed
a tire manufacturer to manufacture and sell a particular type of snow tire
could not compel the manufacturer to pay hin royalties on all the regular
tires it produced. Permitting the licensee to refer to prior patents to
ascertain the scope of the patent under which he is licensed is the simplest
way of defimng the scope of that patent.
The doctrine of estoppel of the licensee is further modified where the
-licensee proves that he is practicing the exact subject matter disclosed
in an expired patent. In such a case the court may hold for the licensee
without even considering the fact that he may still be practicing the in-
vention exactly as it is defined in .the patent under which he is licensed.
In holding for the licensee, the court is, in effect, permitting him to con-
test the validity of the patent under which he is licensed .2 8  Here the
principle that everyone is free to practice an expired patent completely
supersedes the doctrine of estoppel of the licensee.
These principles of estoppel of the licensee also extend to the case of
an assignor or seller of a patent who is said to be estopped from contest-
ing the validity of the patent which he sold and nnphedly warranted as
'Reynolds Metals Co. v. Skinner, 166 F.2d 66 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334
U.S. 858 (1948); cf. E-I-M Co. v. Philadelphia Gear Works, 223 F.2d 36 (5th
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 933 (1956).
'Hall Laboratories v. National Aluminate Corp., 224 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956); Sinko Tool & Mfg. Co. v. Casco Products Corp.,
89 F.2d 916 (7th Cit. 1937).
'Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342
(1924); Garland v. Remington Arms Co., 137 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
'Hall aboratories v. National Aluminate Corp., 224 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956).
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valid29 But where the assignor is sued for infringing the patent which
he sold, his proof that he is practicing the invention of an expired patent
ds an absolute defense to any suit for infringement of a patent, even
though he may 'have received consideration for such patent 30
It is therefore apparent that the principles of estoppel of the licensee
or assignor do not in any way modify the principle that everyone is free
to practice the invention of an expired patent. Indeed, these principles
of estoppel are being restricted to such a point that their vitality is gready
diminished. There is still an argument 1 on the question of whether the
licensee is estopped from showing invalidity of a patent -by means of
prior publication or prior use.32 If this conflict is resolved so as to per-
mat such a showing, as seems likely, what estoppel will be left?
UNFAIR COMPETITION
The one area in which the principle that everyone is -free to practice
the invention of an expired patent is seriously restricted is in the area of
unfair competition. Here, courts prohibit parties competing with the
owner of an expired patent from copying the formerly patented articles.
The law of unfair competition originated m the doctrine that one man
cannot palm off his goods as those of another. "Palming off" was the
essential element -in unfar competition, though it would be found without
proof of misrepresentation.33
Today, the direct imitation of a design, whether the design was the
subject of an inspired patent or not, will be enjoined as unfair compen-
tion, where the imitation will lead to confusion in the mind of the con-
sumer regarding the source of the goods.3 4
In order to prove unfair competition in the copying of a design, it
is necessary for a plaintiff to prove that his design 'had acquired a second-
ary meaning; that is, that tin the mind of the consumer the design meant
that the article was made by the plaintiff.3 5 The secondary meaning must
'cf. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342
(1924).
' Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945).
'Hall Laboratories v. National Alunnate Corp., 224 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1955),
cert. dened, 350 U.S. 932 (1956), wherein the majority and dissenting opinions dis-
agreed on this point.
'See note 23, sections (a) and (c).
'Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Alder, 154 Fed. 37 (2d Cir. 1907); Enterprise Mfg.
Co. v. Landers, 131 Fed. 240 (2d Cir. 1904).
"Lucien Lelong v. Lander Co., 164 F.2d 395 (2d Ci. 1947).
'Saxlehmer v. Wagner, 216 U.S. 375 (1910); Bowdil Co. v. Central Mine Equip.
Co., 216 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 936 (1955); Ross-
Whitney Corp. v. Smith Kline & French Laboratories, 207 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.
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be part of the plaintiff's good will rather than the good will of the product
itself.3 6 Furthermore, m order to establish unfair competition the plain-
tiff must show that the defendanes imitation of the plaintiff's goods
confuses the consumer as to the origin of the goods, 7 and in some cir-
cuits the plaintiff must also show that the consumer purchases the goods
because of their origin.3 s
Although the copying of an article will be enjoined under the doctrine
of unfair competition regardless of whether it is the subject of an expired
patent, the courts, in deciding if the design has acquired a secondary
meaning, require a greater association between the plaintiff and his de-
sign if the design was the subject of an expired patent,3 9 or was used on
a machine which was the subject of an expired patent.4 °
Prohibiting a member of the public from practicing the invention of
an expired patent violates a strong public policy, but injuring a man by
permitting his business to be stolen and at the same time permitting the
"palming off" of another's goods violates an even stronger public policy.
Therefore, the doctrine of unfair competition serves to modify the prin-
ciple that everyone is permntted to practice the invention of an expired
patent.
TRADEMARK
A trademark is a name which, as distinguished from a patent, does
not indicate the goods on which it is used, but instead indicates the per-
son who manufactured the goods. A consideration of trademarks in the
field of expired patents should first include a warning to the owner of a
trademark on a patented article; he must -be careful that his trademark
is used in such a way that it designates the manufacturer Tather than the
1953); Lucien Lelong v. Lander Co., 164 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1947); American
Enameled Products Co. v. Illinois Porcelain Enamel, 123 F.2d 631 (7th Cit. 1941);
Upjohn Co. v. William S. Merrill Chemical Co., 269 Fed. 209 (6th Cir. 1920),
cert. denied, 257 U.S. 638 (1921).
"Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896); West Point Mfg. Co. v.
Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 840
(1955).
'Ross-Wtnmey Corp. v. Smith Kline & French Laboratories, 207 F.2d 190 (9th
Cit. 1953); Paramount Industries v. Solar Products Corp., 186 F.2d 999 (2d Cir.
1951).
'Upjohn Co. v. William S. Merrill Chemical Co., 269 Fed. 209 (6th Cir. 1920),
cert. denied, 257 U.S. 638 (1921).
'Lucien Lelong v. Lander Co., 164 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1947).
'Singer Mffg. Co. v. June MWg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896); West Point Mvffg. Co. v.
Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581 (6th Cit. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 840
(1955).
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goods on which. it is used. If the name is used in such a sense that it
is a generic term for articles produced under a patent the name does not
function in a trademark sense, and hence will become dedicated to the
public along with the patented article when the patent expires 1 Simi-
larly, when the patent expires, a -trademark will become dedicated to the
public where the owner of the trademark permits the public to adopt
it as a generic term for the patented article, even though the trademark
originally connoted the patent owner and at all tunes was part of its
corporate name.4 2
These results are based on the ground that a term, in order to be an
enforceable trademark, must connote the source of the goods on which
it is used. When, instead, it functions as a name for the goods, it merges
with the goods so that anyone free to make the goods is also free to use
the term on them. This requirement - that a name to be a valid trade-
mark must designate the source of the goods - suggests a possible means
of effectively extending the term of a monopoly which was once main-
taned by a patent.
When a -trademark owner develops a well-known trademark for a
patented commodity, while preserving the trademark .for himself by edu-
caring the public to use another term as the generic name for the com-
modity, competitors and customers will want to use the trademark after
the patent expires. To do so, they will take licenses to use it. However,
since the use of a person's trademark on any goods must indicate that the
goods were 'made by him, or at least made under his control, the law
ansists, to the trademark owner's extreme joy, that he must either make or
control the manufacture of any goods bearing his trademark4 3  The law
therefore insists that if the ower of an expired patent licenses the whole
industry to use his trademark, he must insist that they buy the goods from
him or from some plant operated under his supervision.
This practice, while it may create an actual monopoly, does not con-
travene the pnincipal of public property of expired patents because every-
one is free to make, use and sell the patented commodity without using
the patent owner's trademark. The legality of the practice is based on
the theory that if the trademark owner does not control the quality of
.the goods bearing his trademark, a fraud is perpetrated upon the pur-
chasers of the goods who buy them believing that they are his goods.
"Kellogg Co. v. Nauonal Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
" Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
'Crown Beverage Corp. v. Nehi Corp., 196 Misc. 715, 92 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct.
1949); Coca Cola Co. v. State, 225 S.W 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
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CONCLUSION
Patents fulfill their purpose of promoting science and the useful arts
in that -the subject matter of the patent is the property of the public when
it expires, and the article or process of the expired patent can be freely
exploited by any member of the public. This principle is altered only
in the situation where it conflicts with the principles of copying of
design in the law of unfair competition.
The patent monopoly which protected the commodities forming the
subject matter of the patent cannot be extended by a contract to pay
royalties after the patent expires or by contracts tying such commodities to
patented goods, since the doctrine of freedom of contract is modified by
the xule that patents must expire. Nor can a patent monopoly be ex-
tended by including it within an invalid unexpired patent, and estopping
the infringer from contesting the validity of the patent.
Contracts not to compete are ineffective an extending the term of an
expired patent monopoly for any substantial area or period, because such
contracts are strictly construed. If such contracts extended a patent monop-
oly, they would be construed even more strictly. Where the effect of a
contract not to compete is to extend a patent monopoly, the courts will
refuse to enforce the contract, even though its restrictions are reasonable
in time and extent.
Finally, royalties may be collected by the patent owner after the patent
expires either under a patent license extending beyond the expiration of
the patent or under a trademark license, but these licenses do not pre-
dude other members of -the public from practicing the invention of the
expired patent and hence do not extend the patent monopoly.
Only when another member of the public deceives the consumer as to
,the origin of the -goods will the monopoly prevaously established by a
patent be extended beyond the expiration date of the patent. It is
convincingly argued that even this extension should not be permitted
because -the very existence of the patent monopoly has permitted the pat-
ent owner to develop such a secondary meaning in his goodi that he can'
later prevail in an unfair competition action. But the copier is always
free to make the patented article wathout imitating the design which the
patent owner has made popular. The copier can develop his own de-
sign for the device and market it as his own without seeking a free ride
on the good will developed by the pioneer in the field.
KARL A. LMmACH
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